Space Digest Tue, 27 Jul 93 Volume 16 : Issue 928 Today's Topics: Buran and Aviation Week Cold Fusion and its possible uses (if it is proven to exist) Cryogenic Rockets - Controversy between U.S, Russia and India Ghost Wheel space station (2 msgs) Hackers Ethic in Space! lunar mining and the case for space Omnibus Space Commercialization Act (Intro and findings) Shuttle Computers/Software: Redundancy! Crosschecking! space news from May 31 AW&ST Why I hate the space shuttle Welcome to the Space Digest!! Please send your messages to "space@isu.isunet.edu", and (un)subscription requests of the form "Subscribe Space " to one of these addresses: listserv@uga (BITNET), rice::boyle (SPAN/NSInet), utadnx::utspan::rice::boyle (THENET), or space-REQUEST@isu.isunet.edu (Internet). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 27 Jul 1993 05:09:30 GMT From: Henry Spencer Subject: Buran and Aviation Week Newsgroups: sci.space In article <231mrdINNd46@rave.larc.nasa.gov> c.o.egalon@larc.nasa.gov (Claudio Egalon) writes: >> Someone once pointed out that when Aviation Week & ST printed the first >> reasonably accurate drawings of both the Energia and Buran, they included >> the name Buran on the drawing > >... As far as I remember, AW&ST did not comment >about this reader's letter. It's pretty obvious what happened: the artist -- I forget who it was, maybe Charlie Vick -- had sources he wasn't willing to talk about. Anyone who was at the Stine/Bozlee video show at Making Orbit can testify that the well-known civilian Russian-space-program-watchers sometimes do get info that has just *got* to be leaks from the intelligence people. -- Altruism is a fine motive, but if you | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology want results, greed works much better. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 26 Jul 1993 19:01:15 CDT From: U16072@uicvm.uic.edu Subject: Cold Fusion and its possible uses (if it is proven to exist) Newsgroups: sci.physics,sci.space In article <26JUL199314161671@csa3.lbl.gov>, sichase@csa3.lbl.gov (SCOTT I CHASE) says: > >In article <1993Jul26.144727.21019@bsu-ucs>, 01jlwile@leo.bsuvc.bsu.edu >writes... >> >>For those who still are researching cold fusion, the entire question >>is still about RATE. The faster you can make the fusions occur, >>the more power you can generate. So, the size of the cell and the >>amount of power it can generate will not be determined until someone >>can give us some reproducable experiments that measure the rate of >>cold fusion. > >I can't agree that it's "just a matter of rate." That answer seems >to hide a more fundamental truth. I presume that the rate of >cold fusion according to standard QM tunnelling calculations at >room temperature is so incredibly small that you could never hope >to actually measure it in a real experiment on the desktop. Actually it is a matter of rate, but I agree that the phrasing of the statement tends to sort of imply that cold fusion is a fact. The real question is whether the rate in a D20/palladium cell is any larger then in a glass of D20. If not then it can be said that cold fusion does not happen. > >P&F are essentially demanding a new mechanism to account for the >relately huge amounts of energy they claim to see. And that new My understanding of the PHY.LETT A: paper is that they only claim excess heat due to an unknown mechanism, which they do not specify. >mechanism is either real or not real. Different rates require different >mechanisms. So we're not just quibbling over how much cold fusion >there is or isn't. We're arguing about whether P&F have discovered >qualitatively new physics. To top things off, there are many people who do not even believe the excess heat for various reasons. Dr. Huzeniga (sorry if I butcher the spelling ) makes the following statement (paraphrased) "When I review their research for DOE four years ago I said it was very important to do the experiment with closed cells ( to prevent electrolysis exaporates from escaping and thus make heat measurements more accurate). It say something very poor for the research that in four years this has not yet been done." -------------------------------------------------- Thaddeus Olczyk, University of Illinois at Chicago olczyk@uicws.phy.uic.edu ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 27 Jul 1993 04:57:27 GMT From: Henry Spencer Subject: Cryogenic Rockets - Controversy between U.S, Russia and India Newsgroups: sci.space,talk.politics.space I wrote: >>I believe the Australian launch vehicle was all-solid. So was the British. > >Um, if there was ever an Australian launch vehicle, I'm not aware of it. Hmm, tsk tsk, evidently my education has been neglected... There once was an Aussie launch vehicle. Sort of. Wresat (named for the Weapons Research Establishment, its developers) was launched from Woomera 29 Nov 1967 on a "Sparta" launcher. Sparta was an ex-US Redstone, somewhat modified, with a pair of solid upper stages. Whether this actually qualifies as an Australian launcher is a bit debatable. (And in any case, my major point is not at issue -- Sparta's first stage was liquid-fuel.) My somewhat-old copy of The Observer's Spaceflight Directory notes that there was one other pure-Aussie satellite, although it did not go up from Australia: the Oscar 5 radio-amateur satellite, launched as a piggyback payload on a Delta in 1970, was Australian-built. -- Altruism is a fine motive, but if you | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology want results, greed works much better. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 01:42:31 GMT From: Randy Subject: Ghost Wheel space station Newsgroups: sci.space Costs and "politics" somtimes determine which projects end up happening, no matter how good or bad they are. However, your ideas about the orbiting assembly plant, sounds good... When do we start? -- Randy KA1UNW If you get a shock while servicing your equipment, "Works for me!" DON'T JUMP! -Peter Keyes You might break an expensive tube! ------------------------------ Date: 27 Jul 93 05:01:04 GMT From: nsmca@ACAD3.ALASKA.EDU Subject: Ghost Wheel space station Newsgroups: sci.space In article <1993Jul27.014231.16385@cyphyn.UUCP>, randy@cyphyn.UUCP (Randy) writes: > Costs and "politics" somtimes determine which projects end up happening, > no matter how good or bad they are. > > However, your ideas about the orbiting assembly plant, sounds good... > > When do we start? > > > -- > Randy KA1UNW If you get a shock while > servicing your equipment, "Works for me!" > DON'T JUMP! -Peter Keyes > You might break an expensive tube! Well we can either start our own space organization/company, or join space organization that support the idea. Or start a letter writing/fax campaign with the congress.. Understand about cost, poltics, look at the C-5A/B Galaxy Cargo Planes by Lockheed, and you can see politics in motion.. Anyone else liek the idea of having a space station act more as a assembly, contruction, and maintenance station.. And we can attach soem science pods on it and use it for "space science".. Basically what I am saying is the "space station" in the future is going to have to PAY for itself, and not be a "space science first" station.. Sorry to let people kwow this, but reality is a hard pill to swallow.. Anyone read the "Planetary Report" by the "Planetary Society", especially the article/interview of Goldin and Sagan. Interesting.. Interview/session took place Dec 4, 1992. Especially about the part of how many space engineers/scientists do not speak english anymore they speak the dielect of thier sub-group. And people wonder why many people in the US are put off by space sciences.. If people can't understand you, you might as well be speaking Klingonese (I'm working on my spelling,a nd hopefully my grammer to help this along, okay?).. Also in the interview was something about shorter turn around design and up into space, less weight, and more off the shelf equipment.. (yes I am paraphrasing and maybe takign thing sout of context, so get a copy of the article or original transcript).. I think I am beginning to like Mr. Goldin, and maybe "Billins and Billiosn of Stars" Sagen... Now to old business, what about a lottery to ride onthe shuttle or DC-X?? === Ghost Wheel - nsmca@acad3.alaska.edu ------------------------------ Date: 27 Jul 93 05:28:04 GMT From: nsmca@acad3.alaska.edu Subject: Hackers Ethic in Space! Newsgroups: sci.space This might be a wierd posting, but take it to heart, or atleast ask me why I say it, and not think I'm crazy (don't worry the doctors already said it first) Taking the Hackers Ethic into space, It cna be an interesting way to get around the stuffed shirt, suit attitudes of some in certain organizations.. >From Steven Levy's Book "Hackers, heros of the computer revolution" 1. Access to computers-and anything which might teach you something about the way the world works-should be unlimited and total. Always yield to the Hands-On Imperative. 2. All information should be free. 3. Mistrust Authority-Promote Decentralization. 4. Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such as degrees, age, race, or position (Also gender, politics and such, and a few others). 5. You can create art and beauty on a computer. 6. Computers can change your life for the better. Might add: 7. Complex is just bad source code. Make it simpler. 8. Logic is the way to go! Any other additions or comments?? I'm not high, just jacked! Well it's an idea, so I'm nuts, what of it, I'm atleast non-violent. 9. Might add, if it can be doen easier, simpler, and for less cost, and still get the job doen, so it looks ugly, but it works..! ------------------------------ Date: 27 Jul 1993 01:00:37 -0700 From: Nick Szabo Subject: lunar mining and the case for space Newsgroups: sci.space >["mine moon and save Earth" vs. "save Earth first"] It is banal and useless to argue on such a level. Nobody is going to be exporting minerals from Moon to Earth, thereby saving earthside mining costs. I can find all substances you can find on the Moon in my own backyard, and there are tons of valuable substances in my backyard you won't find on the Moon. Neither is anybody ever going to solve all problems on Earth, humans and ecosystems being the imperfect creatures we are. Cutting off our access to space resources (which really means communications, remote sensing, environmental monitoring, etc. at this point) is certainly not a good problem solving strategy. I'd be most concerned about the precedent being set in real frontier resources being locked away from capitalists by socialists and ecofascists today: the spectrum needed for phone cell satellites, and the entire continent of Antartica, are two important frontiers currently being blockaded. -- Nick Szabo szabo@techboook.com ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 20:55:38 PDT From: jim@pnet01.cts.com (Jim Bowery) Subject: Omnibus Space Commercialization Act (Intro and findings) While I no longer believe it is practical to attempt to reform NASA (or any of the other government funded civilian technology agencies) there are those who are still working in this direction and hope to make some sort of impact. Those individuals may still be serving a valuable purpose by forcing the logic of the situation to its conclusion more rapidly, just as Gorbachev was able to do in the Soviet Union. To this end, I am releasing the Coalition for Science and Commerce's Omnibus Space Commercialization Act which was originally developed in 1991, as a resource for those who would like to reform NASA (and similar agencies). Primary credit for this Act goes to Dr. Andrew Cutler, editor of "Space Power" the international technical journal focusing on advanced space technologies such as solar power satellites, originated by Dr. Peter Glaser. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This act may be cited as the "Omnibus Space Commercialization Act". SEC. 2. FINDINGS. The Congress finds that-- (1) America's lasting prestige comes not from her government's programs or expenditures, but from the accomplishment of her private citizens; (2) America's lasting prestige in space will come from the accomplishment of her private citizens making use of the opportunities they find on this new frontier; (3) with the end of the cold war, the vigor and drive of the American people can now be unleashed through free enterprise to open the space frontier, creating enourmous growth and prosperity; (4) lacking policy guidance, NASA has done what bureaucracies tend to do in such circumstances - made perpetuation of the organization while doing business as usual the primary goal of its actions; (5) NASA business as usual discourages private business in space; (6) the space shuttle taught us that reusable vehicles are not necessarily cheaper than expendable ones; (7) that reliance on a single space transportation system is unwise; (8) that government supervised operation cannot realize projected cost savings; (9) that government subsidized operations inhibit commercial participation in the market; (10) that government subsidized development and operations create a business environment where it is difficult to obtain private investment; (11) that privatization of government systems through subsidies to a government chartered service provider which does not have the freedom to select services to offer or prices to charge (e. g. EOSAT) serves neither the marketplace nor the public interest; (12) manned spaceflight should be evaluated on the basis of its potential; (13) the NASA managers in charge of the manned spaceflight program should be evaluated on the basis of its past performance; (14) economic activity, as one of the few self justifying activities, can make space a place where ordinary Americans can live, work and play; (15) the US commercial space industry is technically capable of providing space goods and services in most areas for government and commercial users; (16) private sector market analysis by potential private investors is the best means of determining which space goods and services should be developed; (17) the procurement of commercial space goods and services by the end user would permit a reduced level of Federal Government regulation and oversight, which would result in significant cost savings to the Federal Government; (18) the US commercial space transportation industry is technically capable of providing reliable and cost-efficient access to space; (19) commercial space transportation services, not government services, will be the most effective means to challenge foreign competition; (20) the requirements of government specifications relating to design, construction, and operation impose an unwarranted burden on the engineering and operational freedom necessary to achieve substantial cost reductions in the provision of space goods and services; (21) the requirements of government design specifications, parts specifications, contracting procedures and operational procedures prevent the engineering and operational freedom necessary to operate economically in a competitive marketplace; (22) the use of government owned equipment and facilities in the manufacture of space related hardware discourages the reduction of costs through appropriate capital investment, raises costs due to burdensome bookkeeping requirements and use restrictions, and prevents use of this equipment to provide the same space goods and services to the private sector; (23) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should concentrate its resources on space related research and exploration rather than on development and operation of space technologies; (24) the United States commercial space industry must be competitive in the international marketplace; (25) it is the general policy of the United States government to purchase needed goods and services from the private sector whenever possible, and this policy should include space goods and services as well; (26) the initial application of the policy of purchase of commercial space transportation services has already resulted in significant savings to the United States taxpayer; (27) application of this policy by foreign governments has greatly assisted their respective space transportation industries; (28) predictable access to United States government markets would encourage continuing United States private sector involvement in space and related activities, while saving money for the taxpayer; (29) due to the long history of government activities in potentially commercial areas of space business which were regulated solely by administrative review, private investors and businessmen must be given access to the judicial system to enforce policy and protect their investments before substantial progress will be achieved to expand American commerce into the space frontier; (30) in the traditional system of checks and balances, the judicial branch of the government is best suited to determining whether legislative intent and common law precedent is being followed by administrative actions; (31) the exploration and understanding of space holds the potential to motivate vast new commercial enterprises which will benefit the people of the United States, and all mankind; (32) the development of a robust commercial space industry is necessary to restore and sustain American leadership in the exploration, development, commercialization, and settlement of space; (33) the development of a robust commercial space industry is required to maintain the health and growth of the national economy, meet national security objectives, and sustain the position of the United States as a world power; (34) the people of the United States have a unique heritage of pioneering new frontiers, and have traditionally made innovative use of the resources and new knowledge found there to build our economy and make America great; (35) the United States government has lost its leadership position in space transportation; (36) the United States government has abdicated its early leadership in the use of space stations; (37) United States citizens account for less than a quarter of cumulative time in space; (38) other nations are rapidly approaching America's once unique capabilities for automated exploration of the solar system; (39) the United States government's attempt to fill the role of the private sector in opening and profiting from the space frontier has been unsuccessful; (40) 1970's predictions of the tremendous returns to be realized from a public-private partnership to commercialize space have failed to materialize; (41) government support for the development of space technology has failed to reduce space transportation, payload and operations costs for the past 25 years despite the investment of hundreds of billions of (1991) dollars; (42) the Federal Government's use of its special powers through the Federal Acquisition Regulations make it impossible for private industry to treat it in a commercially reasonable manner, just like any other customer; (43) the government's need for more economical space goods and services, and the United States' need to create a robust space economy far outweigh the needs of any agency to control the peacetime procurement process in any more depth than commercial buyers do; (44) ongoing cost reduction will not occur in the absence of strong competitive pressures from commercial entities; (45) only the private sector operating in a commercially reasonable environment can control costs so as to develop more economical space transportation vehicles, spacecraft, and other payloads and space related services; (46) when government agencies subsidize infrastructure, they often charge a noncompetitively low price, requiring bureaucratic arbitration of access for the large resulting demand which encourages decisionmaking on the basis of politics rather than economics; (47) basic space science research has suffered due to an inordinate emphasis on the development of new technologies by the government; (48) government funded development is seldom free from political objectives, so the proper criteria for evaluating proposed development projects - will they work, do we need them, and are they cost effective - are seldom adhered to ; (49) the proper criteria for evaluating proposed development projects - will they work, do we need them, and are they cost effective - are best determined by commercial entities considering whether to invest on the basis of technical and market information; (50) research is needed in many areas where industry does not yet have enough scientific knowledge to innovate; (51) the United States government is not adequately supporting basic research in many areas where it would address industrial needs; (52) large government development projects have in general not lived up to their initial promise; (53) large government development projects have in general not served scientific or national needs well; (54) large government development projects have often suffered from substantial cost overruns and inordinate delays; (55) large government development projects have consumed resources which could have been used for a wide variety of smaller scale scientific research; (56) large government development projects have foreclosed many more less costly options the nation suffered greatly through losing; (57) large government development projects have typically taken on a political life of their own and are prolonged far past the point where additional investment is wise; (58) the private sector is far better at risk management, and at knowing when to cut its losses, in technology development than is the public sector; (59) Congress should establish clear space policy rather than considering which large development projects to support; (60) the United States government lacks appropriate space policy; (61) the proper role of manned and automated missions cannot be clarified due to inappropriate unstated policy favoring manned programs whenever possible; (62) the selection of manned versus unmanned means to achieve mission objectives is not properly a policy question, but rather an engineering question; (63) the appropriate engineering selection of manned versus unmanned technologies cannot be made since the lack of policy has led to a lack of well defined program and mission goals and objectives; (64) the proper role of the private sector in space activities cannot be clarified due to a lack of policy; (65) the proper role of the government in space activities cannot be determined due to a lack of policy; (66) it is impossible to provide stable year to year funding for NASA and other agencies due to a lack of policy guidance; (67) Congressional policy guidance could bring out the best in NASA and other government agencies; (68) it is not useful to debate how much money NASA and other federal agencies need without first establishing a clear space policy; (69) space policy does not consist of debating whether to give NASA more or less money, or which large development project it should be engaged in next; (70) the Space Settlement Act of 1988 indicated the general intent of Congress with respect to some overall goals of our space program; (71) NASA is not making policy or directing its program to support the general goals described in the Space Settlement Act of 1988; (72) the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as well as policy statements by Presidents Reagan and Bush have made it clear that Congress expects space transportation services to be commercialized sooner or later; (73) the responses by NASA and the Air Force to the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 are inadequate; (74) NASA stated in its testimony on HR 2674 of the 101st Congress that it never expects to see the full and complete commercialization of launch services or other space transportation services; (75) NASA has failed to fulfil the reporting requirements of the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, the Space Settlements Act of 1988, and many other Acts, Appropriations and Reauthorizations; (76) the current programmatic commingling of military and civilian space, historically for good reason, is no longer necessary; (77) the combination of military and civilian space activities is no longer consistent with United States obligations under treaty and international law in light of the Space Settlement Act of 1988; (78) the combined nature of our military and civilian space program has led to substantial international turmoil, such as has periodically affected the Space Station Freedom program; (79) the military has not been well served by reliance on NASA facilities and equipment, viz the difficulty in placing reconnaissance satellites in orbit during the period of military dependence on the Space Shuttle; (80) NASA has not been well served by reliance on military equipment, facilities and services; (81) contracting requirements derived from military regulations are inappropriate and burdensome for a civilian program which is supposed to encourage space commercialization; (82) secrecy and security classification are not consistent with civilian space science and commerce; (83) military aerospace technologies, when developed at government initiative, do not usually lead to cost effective space goods and services to fill civilian or commercial needs; (84) commercial and civilian aerospace technologies do not have adequate performance to meet many military mission requirements; (85) export restrictions applying to aersospace technology with potential military use greatly hinders United States commerce from exploiting lucrative world markets; (86) aerospace contractors engaged in both military and civilian work often use expensive military technology due to its familiarity instead of developing and using cost effective commercial technology when appropriate; (87) United States and international civilian customers for aerospace products often have difficulty working with suppliers who are used to military procurement procedures and standards; (88) the emplacement of substantial numbers of military personnel for an extended period of time by any country on a celestial body other than for the legitimate defense of its citizens and their property would be interpreted as a de facto claim of sovereignty; (89) the continuing presence of substantial numbers of military personnel on a space station or facility on a celestial body would indicate that this was a military rather than a civilian facility; (90) international bans on weapons of mass destruction in space, and the Nuremberg precedent banning aggressive warfare, as well as the United Nations charter in which the United States agrees not to use war as an instrument of policy, leave defense of citizens and their property and of the immediate locale if on a celestial body as the only legitimate need for military forces in space; (91) with the current and foreseeable level of international space weaponry the defense of neither civilian nor military space assets (as opposed to the defense of Earth's surface from ballistic missiles) requires or would benefit from the presence of military personnel or space based weaponry; (92) the United States government has supported a substantial amount of research directed at microgravity materials processing; (93) current NASA plans for the use of Space Station Freedom as a transportation node are not consistent with its use as a materials processing laboratory or factory; (94) current NASA discussions of materials processing in space and of extraterrestrial resource utilization assume that the government will own the facilities and make management decisions regarding how they are to be operated; (95) the political system where the government owns and manages the means of production is known as socialism; (96) socialism has a long history of mediocrity and failure; (97) the recent collapse of socialism in the Eastern Bloc makes its lack of economic viability clear; (98) the United States is not a socialist country; (99) there is no reason to expect socialism to work any better in space than it does on Earth; (100) there is every reason to expect socialism to fail as miserably in space as it has on Earth; (101) the current turmoil in the Soviet Union illustrates how resistant bureaucracy is to reform, even in the face of immense pressure; (102) through its long history of owning manufacturing facilities and making management decisions regarding their operation, some elements of socialist bureaucracy may have formed at NASA; (103) the justifications for government control of military ordnance facilities does not apply to civilian rocket facilities; (104) space is a new frontier; (105) historically, bureaucracies, as far back as China in the 1400's, have turned their back on new frontiers; (106) tremendous new wealth and opportunity can be created on the space frontier through private economic activity; (107) the space frontier provides great opportunity to discover new and useful knowledge; (108) the space frontier provides great challenge and inspiration to the human spirit; (109) the space frontier should be accessible to all, without regard to race, creed, color, sex, or social standing; (110) America's future greatness lies on the space frontier; (111) future global stability lies in exploiting the opportunities available on the space frontier; (112) new opportunity can best be created by private entities; (113) new opportunity can best be created when private entities both bear the risks and reap the rewards of engineering and economic development; (114) the United States government should free the American people to open the space frontier through private endeavor by appropriate legislation and treaty negotiation; (115) the United States government should encourage Americans to create a spacefaring civilization without undue government regulation, legislation, treaty restrictions or other restraints; (116) the United States government should support the exploration, mapping and characterization of this new frontier as it has done with other frontiers in the past; (117) the United States government should support the discovery of basic knowledge potentially applicable to needed new technologies; (118) the United States government should support the discovery of basic knowledge which will help us understand our place in the Universe better; (119) the United States government should support a preliminary survey of economically valuable resources available in near Earth space as it has done with other frontiers in the past; (120) the United States government must regulate and protect the property rights of American citizens and business entities in space; (121) the Federal Government should encourage, facilitate, and promote United States commercial space activities, including the development of commercial launch and other space transportation facilities, commercial space transportation services, commercial space stations, commercial space manufacturing processes, commercial lunar bases and Martian outposts, and the commercial use of extraterrestrial resources in order to ensure United States economic preeminence in space, and should do so with minimum direct Federal subsidy; (122) the creation of a space infrastructure and transportation industries in a timely, profitable, innovative, and sustainable manner can be accomplished only by private enterprise; (123) the tremendous economic growth possible through space commercialization can only be realized by the private sector; (124) incentives are needed to encourage private enterprise to embark upon the high risk ventures involved in space commercialization; (125) well defined property rights are needed for private enterprise to create a growing economy in space; and (126) commercial space activities present unique legal problems that need to be clarified before the industrialization of space can go forward. (to be continued) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Never attribute to ignorance that which can be attributed to self interest. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: 27 Jul 93 05:09:36 GMT From: nsmca@acad3.alaska.edu Subject: Shuttle Computers/Software: Redundancy! Crosschecking! Newsgroups: sci.space I think soem one once mentioned that there is more than one computer onboard the shuttle.. I think what is the basic design that keep the shuttle safer than most, is "REDUNDANCY" and " CROSS CHECKING".. I would think (personnel opition, until checked by some one who might know), is that when something happens on the shuttle, it is checked by atleast two computers to check for BUGS, Glitches and such. I have heard that if oen computer goes down, it stays down until it gets to earth, so basically the shuttle is controlled by a noded computer.. === Ghost Wheel - nsmca@acad3.alaska.edu PS: Please correct me if I'm wrong, information is great when correct, but dangerous when wrong! ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 27 Jul 1993 05:02:45 GMT From: Henry Spencer Subject: space news from May 31 AW&ST Newsgroups: sci.space In article <2316hj$4r2@news.acns.nwu.edu> lentz@reber.astro.nwu.edu (Robert A. Lentz) writes: >>... It is not clear why wing 1 is suffering and wing 2 >>is not, although there is suspicion that it may be materials failures >>associated with the fact that only wing 1 got the full battery of >>pre-launch acoustic-stress tests. > >...Kind of goes along with something I heard not too long ago: they do > not do as harsh ground testing as they used to because the > spacecraft now are too fragile to handle it... And also because they learned that the ground tests sometimes did more harm than good. Max Hunter observed, at Making Orbit, that the USAF insisted that all Thor missiles be static-fired before launch... and that there was not a single instance of a real problem being found that way, but there were several instances of launch failures attributed to the extra wear and tear of the preliminary static firings. They eventually talked the USAF into suspending that requirement. >>A further problem is that some of Eureca's hydrazine valves are acting >>up -- three times, a valve has opened inadvertently -- and this could >>present safety problems if more than one opened... > >How does one not present a safety problem? There is enough redundancy in the valve system that a single malfunctioning valve could not lead to a hydrazine release. -- Altruism is a fine motive, but if you | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology want results, greed works much better. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry ------------------------------ Date: 27 Jul 1993 07:57:29 GMT From: Dieter Kreuer Subject: Why I hate the space shuttle Newsgroups: sci.space In article <230oht$afc@usenet.rpi.edu>, strider@clotho.acm.rpi.edu (Greg Moore) wrote: > Actually only the ET id disposable. Hmm, the SRB's can be reused, but, has any SRB been used more than once ever? I have heard that even before the Challenger disaster NASA had not dared this, and I assume that this attitude has not changed since. Anyway, I think the Shuttle is a great machine, and perhaps replacing the expendables by a fully reusable vehicle would have been a step too large and too revolutionary. But with almost twenty years passed by since the Shuttle design had started, I think it's high time to work out new designs, fully reusable and specialised for different applications (heavy loads to LEO, light loads and crews to LEO, light loads to GTO or to the Moon, etc.). DC seems like a step in this direction. So, I like the Shuttle AND the DC. ----------------------- --------------------------------- Dieter Kreuer ## ======== / dieter@informatik.rwth-aachen.de Lehrstuhl Informatik IV __ /// /# / dieter%informatik.rwth- RWTH Aachen ## /// # # / aachen.de@uunet.uu.net D-52056 Aachen ## /// ##### /...!informatik.rwth-aachen.de!dieter Germany ==== # / PHONE: +49 241 80 21413 ------------------------------ End of Space Digest Volume 16 : Issue 928 ------------------------------